Files
anwar-pi-website/web/src/collections/Users.ts
T
AHMED 0161924088 Free early-access launch: LAUNCH_MODE policy, CRO, pipeline hardening, AI-SEO, ops
- launch.ts policy: LAUNCH_MODE=free_early_access default; effective access =
  published && (free || early); intended tier (access) never rewritten
- Billing off server-side: /api/subscribe 503 honest copy; subscribe CTAs
  render disabled 'قريباً' from first paint; /subscription early-access panel
  + /api/notify (LaunchNotifications) with honest 503 when mail transport off
- Signup trust: verification email at signup (Users afterChange), no
  confirm-password, 429 message fidelity, typo suggestion, live password hint
- Agent pipeline: pickFields strips access/readingMinutes, sourceId dedup,
  secret-scan 422 (pattern names only), string-content rejected (was silently
  replaced), publish stays explicit opt-in
- lexical.ts: root unwrap fix — lexicalToText/countLexicalWords returned 0
  for real serialized trees (secret scan + readingMinutes were inert)
- llms-full.txt: fetchIndexDocs(true) — bodies were never selected
- Content honesty: contentType/authorName/sourceId fields + migration,
  readingMinutes computed at write (160 wpm) + backfill script, byline,
  'حُدّث' freshness
- SEO/AI-SEO: metadata rewrite (published-only, og:image 1200x630), Article +
  BreadcrumbList + FAQPage + Organization JSON-LD, isAccessibleForFree honest,
  table renderer, robots AI-crawler policy (10 named bots), llms.txt +
  llms-full.txt, /topics/* hubs + sitemap, noindex auth pages, www 301
- Ops: backup-db.sh (restore rehearsed on VPS), docs copies (launch
  readiness + marketing audit + owner-inputs for L-03), GLOSSARY.md entries

Verified: tsc --noEmit 0, npm run build 0, local smoke (ghost VIP read,
subscribe/notify/agent APIs, signup token, 429 on 6th, llms/topics/sitemap,
og:image/JSON-LD)
2026-10-10 18:03:45 +03:00

193 lines
7.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { pbkdf2, randomBytes } from 'crypto'
import { promisify } from 'util'
import type { AccessArgs, CollectionConfig } from 'payload'
import { sendVerificationEmail } from '@/lib/mail'
const isAdmin = (args: AccessArgs) =>
(args.req.user as { role?: string } | null | undefined)?.role === 'admin'
export const ROLES = ['free', 'vip', 'admin'] as const
const Users: CollectionConfig = {
slug: 'users',
auth: { maxLoginAttempts: 5, lockTime: 15 * 60 * 1000 },
admin: {
useAsTitle: 'email',
defaultColumns: ['email', 'role', 'createdAt'],
},
access: {
admin: isAdmin,
// Only self and admins can read full user docs
read: ({ req, id }) =>
req.user?.role === 'admin' || (id != null && req.user?.id === id),
// Public open for self-signup; beforeChange forces role 'free' for non-admins
create: () => true,
update: ({ req, id }) =>
req.user?.role === 'admin' || req.user?.id === id,
delete: isAdmin,
},
hooks: {
// Admin accounts never lock out (owner decision 2026-10-09): clear any lock
// before the login flow reads it. db.updateOne bypasses hooks on purpose —
// incrementLoginAttempts writes the same way, so this cannot be intercepted
// in beforeChange.
beforeOperation: [
async ({ args, operation, req }) => {
if (operation !== 'login') return
const email =
typeof args?.data?.email === 'string' ? args.data.email.toLowerCase().trim() : null
if (!email) return
const { docs } = await req.payload.find({
collection: 'users',
where: { email: { equals: email } },
limit: 1,
depth: 0,
overrideAccess: true,
})
const user = docs[0] as { id: number; role?: string } | undefined
if (!user) {
// F7: with no matching user, Payload would skip hashing and fail
// fast, letting attackers enumerate emails via response time. Burn
// the same PBKDF2 cost as a real verify (600000 iters / 32 bytes /
// sha256 — same params as payload's generatePasswordSaltHash), then
// fall through to the standard invalid-credentials error.
const password = typeof args?.data?.password === 'string' ? args.data.password : 'x'
await promisify(pbkdf2)(password, 'anwarpy-dummy-salt-v1', 600000, 32, 'sha256')
return
}
if (user.role !== 'admin') return
await req.payload.db.updateOne({
collection: 'users',
id: user.id,
data: { lockUntil: null, loginAttempts: 0 },
})
},
],
// Signup must never mint VIP/admin accounts or set Stripe IDs. Local-API
// activation (payment success) passes context.systemActivation to bypass.
beforeChange: [
({ data, req, operation, context, originalDoc }) => {
const trusted = req.user?.role === 'admin' || context?.systemActivation === true
if (!trusted) {
delete data.stripeCustomerId
delete data.verificationToken
delete data.emailVerified
// `onboarded` is intentionally self-writable: the member wizard
// PATCHes { level, onboarded: true } on its own account. Signup
// still cannot pre-set it — the create branch below forces false.
if (operation === 'create') {
data.role = 'free'
data.emailVerified = false
data.onboarded = false
if (data.termsVersion) data.termsAcceptedAt = new Date().toISOString()
} else if ('role' in data) {
// keep current role — non-admins can never change it, but the
// field must stay present or required-validation fails
data.role = originalDoc.role
}
}
return data
},
],
// L-06 signup trust: the verify-email page claims «أرسلنا رابط التأكيد» —
// make that true at signup instead of only after clicking resend. Mirror
// api/auth/resend-verification exactly: fresh token → internal update
// (systemActivation bypasses the beforeChange token strip) → email.
// Mail env absent → sendVerificationEmail returns { sent: false } and the
// hook skips silently; the resend route keeps the honest-503 path.
afterChange: [
async ({ doc, operation, req }) => {
if (operation !== 'create' || !doc?.email) return
try {
const token = randomBytes(32).toString('hex')
await req.payload.update({
collection: 'users',
id: doc.id,
data: { verificationToken: token },
overrideAccess: true,
context: { systemActivation: true },
req,
})
await sendVerificationEmail(doc.email, token)
} catch (err) {
console.error('signup verification email failed:', err)
}
},
],
},
fields: [
{
name: 'fullName',
type: 'text',
label: 'Full Name',
},
{ name: 'termsVersion', type: 'text', label: 'Terms version', admin: { hidden: true } },
{ name: 'termsAcceptedAt', type: 'date', label: 'Terms accepted at', admin: { hidden: true } },
{
name: 'interest',
type: 'select',
label: 'Interest (from member onboarding)',
options: [
{ label: 'الوكلاء وتنسيقهم', value: 'الوكلاء' },
{ label: 'الاسترجاع وRAG', value: 'RAG' },
{ label: 'الأتمتة للأعمال', value: 'الأتمتة' },
{ label: 'النماذج المفتوحة', value: 'النماذج المفتوحة' },
],
},
{
name: 'level',
type: 'select',
label: 'Experience level',
options: [
{ label: 'مبتدئ', value: 'مبتدئ' },
{ label: 'متوسط', value: 'متوسط' },
{ label: 'متقدم', value: 'متقدم' },
],
},
{
name: 'goal',
type: 'select',
label: 'Goal (from VIP onboarding)',
options: [
{ label: 'بناء مشروع ذكاء اصطناعي', value: 'بناء مشروع ذكاء اصطناعي' },
{ label: 'تطوير مساري المهني', value: 'تطوير مساري المهني' },
{ label: 'أتمتة العمل', value: 'أتمتة العمل' },
{ label: 'فهم الوكلاء بعمق', value: 'فهم الوكلاء بعمق' },
],
},
{
name: 'prefs',
type: 'json',
label: 'Notification prefs',
admin: { description: 'weekly/trackUpdates/replies switches (VIP onboarding)' },
},
{ name: 'emailVerified', type: 'checkbox', defaultValue: false, label: 'Email verified' },
{
name: 'verificationToken',
type: 'text',
hidden: true,
admin: { readOnly: true, description: 'Email verification token (hashed at rest not required for this flow)' },
},
{ name: 'onboarded', type: 'checkbox', defaultValue: false, label: 'Onboarding completed' },
{
name: 'role',
type: 'select',
required: true,
defaultValue: 'free',
options: [
{ label: 'Free', value: 'free' },
{ label: 'VIP', value: 'vip' },
{ label: 'Admin', value: 'admin' },
],
},
{
name: 'stripeCustomerId',
type: 'text',
label: 'Stripe Customer ID',
admin: { readOnly: true, position: 'sidebar' },
},
],
}
export default Users